Inter-Household private transfers and underlying motives : evidence for Bulgaria by Menezes, António Gomes de
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Universidade dos Açores 
Universidade da Madeira 
 
 
 
CEEAplA WP No. 02/2006 
 
Inter-Household Private Transfers and 
Underlying Motives: Evidence for Bulgaria 
 
 
 
António Gomes de Menezes 
 
February 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-Household Private Transfers and 
Underlying Motives: Evidence for Bulgaria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
António Gomes de Menezes 
Universidade dos Açores (DEG) 
e CEEAplA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n.º 02/2006 
Fevereiro de 2006 
CEEAplA Working Paper n.º 02/2006 
Fevereiro de 2006 
 
 
 
RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Inter-Household Private Transfers and 
Underlying Motives: Evidence for Bulgaria 
 
  
The effects of interactions between private transfer behavior and income 
redistribution policies depend on the motives underlying private income 
transfers. This paper tests for two different potential motives: pure altruism 
versus simple exchange, in the presence of capital market imperfections. Using 
household survey data for Bulgaria, microeconometric evidence is found that 
both motives are in effect. We also find evidence that capital market 
imperfections are likely to be binding for consumption smoothing, and hence are 
an important cause of private transfers. The results indicate that social security 
benefits “crowd in” the incidence of private transfers, but not the amounts 
transferred. 
 
 
Keywords: Inter-Household Private Transfers, Altruism, Exchange, 
Capital Market Imperfections. 
 
 
JEL Codes: D19, O16, I30, H55 
 
 
 
 
 
António Gomes de Menezes 
Departamento de Economia e Gestão 
Universidade dos Açores 
Rua da Mãe de Deus, 58 
9501-801 Ponta Delgada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-Household Private Transfers and
Underlying Motives: Evidence for Bulgaria
António Gomes de Menezes
University of the Azores and CEEAplA
February 2006
Abstract
The e¤ects of interactions between private transfer behavior and in-
come redistribution policies depend on the motives underlying private
income transfers. This paper tests for two di¤erent potential motives:
pure altruism versus simple exchange, in the presence of capital market
imperfections. Using household survey data for Bulgaria, microeconomet-
ric evidence is found that both motives are in e¤ect. We also nd evidence
that capital market imperfections are likely to be binding for consumption
smoothing, and hence are an important cause of private transfers. The
results indicate that social security benets crowd in the incidence of
private transfers, but not the amounts transferred.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of operative inter-household private transfers, the e¤ects of in-
come redistribution policies become uncertain and dependent on the motives
underlying inter-household private transfers. For instance, Becker (1974, 1993)
shows that if inter-household private transfers are operative and are an outcome
of altruistic feelings satisfaction, households can completely neutralize the ef-
fects of income redistribution policies, by adjusting the levels of their transfers
(see also Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1997)). However, if households are
motivated by exchange, that is, if households give because they expect some-
thing in return, this result does not hold (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (2000),
Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1987) and Cox (1987, 1990)). Hence, if one is
interested in anticipating the outcome of a given income redistribution policy,
one must understand the motives behind inter-household private transfers. This
paper does just that, looking at the case of Bulgaria.
In particular, this paper tests the empirical relevance of two hypotheses - the
altruism hypothesis and the exchange hypothesis - which have been accepted in
the literature as the main driving forces behind inter-household private transfers
(see Cox et al. (1998)). As its name suggests, under the altruism hypothesis
households give to satisfy their altruistic feelings. In turn, under the exchange
hypothesis, households give because they expect something in return, namely a
future repayment. While it is likely that both motives are at work, it is plausible
that they may not work to the same extent. Therefore, it is important to test
which motive dominates at an empirical level in order to anticipate the outcome
of a given income redistribution policy. This empirical question has important
implications for a number of policies. If the altruism hypothesis is the main
driving force behind inter-household transfers, then households may neutralize
not only income redistribution policies, but also tax and debt policies, as several
authors in the macroeconomics and public nance literature have argued (see,
for instance, Barro (1974)).
Inter-household private transfers are also important for reallocating resources.
Cox and Jimenez (1990) document for a large sample of countries that more than
half of the households engage in private transfers. In addition, and quite inter-
estingly, Cox and Jimenez also show that it is often the case that the amount of
transfers received is large in the sense that it constitutes an economically impor-
tant fraction of the households overall income. Hence, studying inter-household
transfer behavior is important not only for a better understanding of allocation
of resources but also to how safety nets work. Therefore, the empirical work in
this paper also sheds light on important relationships that structural models of
the household must rationalize.
We use microeconometric data to carry out our empirical work, for Bulgaria,
collected by the World Bank, which allows us to control for an interesting num-
ber of household economic and demographic characteristics. We follow Altonji,
Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (2000), Cox, Jimenez and Okrasa (1997), Cox, Jimenez
and Eser (1998), Cox, Hansen and Jimenez (2004), among others, and estimate
a microeconometric model of the determinants of the incidence of transfers and
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of the amount of transfers received. Our contribution is, thus, empirical.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that
guides the econometric work. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 documents
the empirical work. Finally, Section 5 concludes with policy implications.
2 Theory on Motives for Inter-Households Pri-
vate Transfers
This section presents a simple model of the decision to transfer income between
households in order to motivate and guide the empirical work. To test which
motive - altruism vs. exchange - is the most important driving force underlying
inter-household transfers one must look at the relationship between the recip-
ients pre-transfer income and the transfer amounts received. Under the pure
altruism hypothesis this relationship is always negative. The exchange hypoth-
esis, in turn, is not inconsistent with either a positive or a negative relationship
between these two variables. Moreover, and still under the exchange hypothesis,
and in the presence of capital market imperfections, transfer amounts received
should rise with low levels of pre-transfer income and decline for high levels
of pre-transfer income. That is, transfer amounts received is non-linear and
concave in pre-transfer income, and hence non-monotonic.
Capital market imperfections are likely to be a strong cause of private trans-
fers. If we consider households who wish to smooth their real consumption levels
over their life-cycle, then if capital market imperfections bind, they will be un-
able to achieve their rst-best real consumption path (Cox (1990)). This fact
may prompt households to engage in private transfers with other households.
This observation becomes clear if we assume for simplicity that capital markets
are "perfectly imperfect". In particular, young households whose actual income
is lower than their permanent income cannot borrow against their potentially
higher income that they will receive while middle aged. Similarly, middle aged
households whose actual income is higher than their permanent income cannot
save for their retirement. What actions can these households take to ease the
restrictions that they face? To answer to this question, we present below simple
models of both the altruism hypothesis and of the exchange hypothesis that
help us in setting up the empirical work. Admittedly, we do not fully develop
the models as they are developed elsewhere. Our goal here is to provide enough
intuition to develop our empirical tests.
Altruism Consider rst altruistically motivated private transfers. The
model presented to illustrate this hypothesis features utility interdependence
and is due to Becker (1974). Suppose that parents care about their children,
so that when childrens income is low enough, as it would be early in the life-
cycle, parents transfer income to their children. In addition, children care about
their parentswell being, so that when the parentsearning power is low - i.e.
retirement years - children transfer income to their parents. Formally, this utility
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inter dependence setting can be expressed by the following set of equations:
U = U(cp; V ) (1)
where U denotes parental utility, a positive function of parental consumption
cp and childrens utility V . Since we assume that altruism is mutual, there is
an analogous expression for the childrens well being:
V = U(ck; U) (2)
where ck denotes childrens consumption (k is a mnemonic for kids). The fol-
lowing budget constraints capture capital market imperfections:
cj = Ij + Tj , j = p; k (3)
where Tj denotes transfers received, net of transfers given by person j, and Ij
denotes person js pre-transfer income.
Assume that parents and children overlap for 2 periods, 1 and 2. Period 1
is youth period for children and middle age for parents and period 2 is middle
age for children and retirement for parents. In terms of pre-transfer income
conguration, we have the following pattern:
Ik;1 : low; Ik;2 : high
Ip;1 : high; Ip;2 : low
The main insight of altruistically motivated private transfers is very simple:
Private transfers can help overcome capital market imperfections, as parents
transfer income to children in the rst period and children transfer income to
parents in the second period. A key prediction of this model is that an increase
in pre-transfer income is always associated with a decline in transfers. Children
with higher Ik;1 require smaller Tk to attain the level of consumption that is
optimal from the parentsperspective. This results holds for Tp in the second
period. In terms of derivatives, we have @Tk@Ik;1 < 0 and
@Tp
@Ip;2
< 0 regardless of
income levels.
Note that transfer behavior has two dimensions. The rst is to transfer or
not (the decision) and the second, contingent on deciding to transfer, is the
amount to transfer. An increase in Ik;1 reduces the parentsmarginal utility of
transferring income to the children and thus we expect a negative relationship
between the incidence of transfers (likelihood of being a net receiver) and the
recipients pre transfer income under the altruism hypothesis.
Exchange This section presents a simple model of the exchange hypothesis
taken from Cox et al. (1998). Suppose that parents and children realize the
potential to engage in mutually benecial income transfers. Parents transfer to
children in the rst period and are paid back in the second period. Assume
Nash bargaining. The parents and childrens lifetime utilities are dened as
follows:
U = U1(Ip;1   T ) + U2(Ip;2 +R)
1 + 
+ V (4)
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V = V1(Ik;1 + T ) +
V2(Ik;2  R)
1 + 
+ U (5)
where  is the subjective rate of time preference, which for simplicity is assumed
to be the same for parents and children. The parental loan is denoted by T and
the repayment is denoted by R. Altruism is not dispensed in this particular
bargaining framework. But this depiction of altruism di¤ers from the altru-
ism hypothesis above, in which one agent implicitly dominates the bargaining
arrangement. The levels of utility that parents and children can obtain on their
own - the threat points - are given by:
U0 = U01 (Ip;1) +
U02 (Ip;2)
1 + 
+ V 0 (6)
V 0 = V 01 (Ik;1) +
V 02 (Ik;2)
1 + 
+ U0 (7)
As usual, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem is given by:
max
T; R
N = (U   U0)  (V   V 0) (8)
The implications of the bargaining solution are easiest to see with a simulation
exercise. Consider logarithmic functional forms for equations (4)-(7) and sup-
pose that Ik;2 = 150, Ip;1 = 150, Ip;2 = 20,  = 0:25 and  =  = 0:30. Figure
1 displays the results of varying Ik;1 from 1 to 30 on the value of rst period
transfers T . Transfers initially rise with Ik;1, which contradicts the results from
the altruism model.
When Ik;1 increases two e¤ects take place. The rst e¤ect is that the chil-
drens liquidity constraint is eased, which reduces the rst period transfer. The
second e¤ect is that the childrens threat point utility rises. This second e¤ect
causes an increase in transfers, because the terms on which the children can bor-
row improve: The implicit interest rate for intergenerational loans, (R  T )=T ,
declines as Ik;1 rises. If the second e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect, @T@Ik;1 is posi-
tive. Furthermore, since the second e¤ect is stronger at lower levels of Ik;1, @
2T
@I2k;1
is negative under the exchange hypothesis.
Under the exchange hypothesis, an increase in the recipients pre-transfer
income reduces the chances that intergenerational lending is mutually benecial.
Thus, the incidence of transfers is inversely related to own pre-transfer income,
just as under the altruism hypothesis. However, while the exchange hypothesis
implies that an increase in the income of potential recipients should decrease
the likelihood of receiving transfers it can increase the amounts transferred.
3 Data
The data set used in the empirical work is the Bulgarian Living Standards Mea-
surement Survey (BLSMS), conducted by the World Bank and Gallup Interna-
tional Soa. The BLSMS collected socioeconomic information for a sample of
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2468 households and 7199 individuals. The interviews took place in May 1995.
Households constitute the unit of analysis. Households with missing informa-
tion for age, education, and gender of the head of the household, and households
with no residents were deleted from the sample. The nal sample has 2427 ob-
servations. Income variables are presented and analyzed on a monthly basis.
Almost 30% of the sample engaged in private transfers, or about 700 house-
holds. Of these, about 15% received a private transfer, while 13.7% gave private
transfers. Only 50 households both donated and received transfers. For the sub-
sample that received a transfer, private transfers averaged 2602 leva, roughly
23% of this same group average pre-transfer income. Social security benets
averaged 2194 leva for all sample. From these descriptive statistics, one can see
that private transfers may play a crucial role in poverty alleviation, income redis-
tribution and their interaction with public policies is, thus, potentially intense.1
Households were asked to specify the sources of transfers received and destina-
tions of transfers given. The table below summarizes the relative frequency of
sources of transfers:
Relationship Source of Transfer (%)
Parents 68.35
Children 17.17
Other Relatives 5.39
Brother/Sister 5.39
Spouse 1.68
Non-relatives 2.02
Total 100.00
Perhaps as expected (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1996)), the bulk of
transfers occurred between parents and children. The main source of transfers
was from parents to children (68%). The second most important source of
transfers was from children to parents (17%). Transfers among non-relatives
occurred only in 2% of the cases.
4 Empirical Work
4.1 Empirical Model
In order to learn about the determinants of inter-household private transfers
behavior - incidence and volume - we follow the literature (see Cox, Hansen and
Jimenez (2004), Cox, Eser and Jimmenez (1998) and Cox, Jimenez and Okrasa
(1997), among others) and estimate an ordered probit model and a Heckman
selection model (see Greene (2003) for details on both models). With respect
to the former, we estimate an ordered probit model to learn more about the
incidence of transfers, encompassing not only net-receivers but also net-givers
1To preserve on space, we refer to Hassan and Peters (1995) for an extensive discussion of
social safety nets in Bulgaria.
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and households who do not engage in private transfers. More formally:
oh = 0 + 1Ih + 2I
2
h + X1h + h (9)
oh = 0 (net  giver), if oh  cut1,
oh = 1 (non  participant), if cut1 < oh  cut2, and
oh = 2 (net  receiver), if oh > cut1,
where h is a normally distributed disturbance, cut1 and cut2 are ancillary
parameters estimated by MLE, and X1h is a vector containing the covariates
whose e¤ect on predicted probabilities we are interested in. Table 1 summarizes
the main results from the ordered probit model, which we comment in the next
section.
We also estimate a regression model of the amount of transfers received. As
usual, and since there is scope for a potential selection problem, we estimate a
Heckman selection model. The selection equation reads:
th = a0 + a1Ih + a2I
2
h + aX2h + eh (10)
Th > 0 i¤ th > 0,
Th = 0 otherwise
where h indexes households, th is the latent variable, Th is the actual amount
of transfers received, Ih is pre-transfer income and X2h is a collection of socioe-
conomic variables, including age, education and other demographic variables
and eh is an error term. The estimating equation for transfer amounts received
reads:
Th = b0 + b1Ih + b2I
2
h + bX3h + E(hjTh > 0) (11)
and h and is a random error component. Table 2 summarizes the main results
from the Heckman selection model.
The exchange model predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between re-
cipients income and transfer amounts received that can be tested by a quadratic
form in income. The altruism model, in turn, predicts a monotonically decreas-
ing relationship between those variables. Pre-transfer income also enters in
quadratic form in the selection equation because, although neither model pre-
dicts a denite sign for a2, they do not imply a linear relationship between
pre-transfer income and the incidence of transfers. This way, hence, less struc-
ture is imposed. The model is estimated by MLE, with STATA, using as starting
values the values obtained from Heckmans 2-step procedure. Identication of
the model is guaranteed by the fact that the relevant X2h is a subset of X3h
(see Cox, Eser and Jimmenez (1998) for more on the identication strategy).
4.2 Results
Since both altruism and exchange models are derived under the assumption of
capital market imperfections, before proceeding one must investigate if capital
market imperfections are likely at place. One way to analyze this issue is to
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consider the case of perfect capital markets. If capital market imperfections do
not matter, the position of the household over her life-cycle should not matter for
the probability of receiving a transfer. Only the present value of lifetime wealth
would matter. This contradicts the results illustrated in Figure 2, constructed
from the ordered probit analysis presented on Table 1. The probability of being
a net-receiver for a household with average characteristics in all aspects other
than age rst declines and then increases with household age (proxied by the
heads age). Middle aged households (with higher earning power) are the less
likely to receive a transfer, where the youngest are the most likely. Capital
market imperfections are, hence, very likely to bind.
Table 2 summarizes the results from joint estimation of (10) and (11). The
reason for joint estimation as an MLE problem is to correct the amounts equa-
tion coe¢ cients for a possible selection problem. However, as Table 2 docu-
ments, there is no signicant selection problem. The point estimate for  (the
coe¢ cient associated with the Inverse Mills Ratio) is only 0.08, which is sta-
tistically equal to zero, at conventional condence levels (asymptotic t stat. is
0.638).
For the structural amounts equation, pre-transfer income has a positive sign
and pre-transfer income squared has a negative sign, as predicted by the ex-
change or bargaining model. However, these coe¢ cients are both statistically
insignicant, at conventional condence levels. For the selection (feeder probit)
equation, the signs of these variables are reversed, which is consistent with both
models. The relationship between pre-transfer income and transfers is not clear
from these statistics. Both models are not rejected and a plausible explanation
is that both motives matter to a fairly equally important matter. More light can
be shed into this issue when we combine information from both the structural
and the selection equations to obtain Figure 3. In Figure 3 the value of expected
receipts for a household with average education and demographic characteristics,
monotonically decreases with pre-transfer income (which is allowed to change
in percentiles, in 60 equal steps, from the 1st to the 99th percentile). This
result should be interpreted with caution since the pattern may be inuenced
by a declining probability rather than an overall negative relationship between
recipients pre-transfer income and transfers. Nevertheless, it is contradictory
with the exchange model and consistent with the altruism model.
An interesting result in its own right concerns the empirical relation between
public transfers and inter-household private transfers. There is no evidence of
crowding out between private transfers and public transfers, in the form of
social security benets. Both the probit equation of the Heckman selection
model (Table 2) and the ordered probit (Table 1) indicate that the likelihood of
receiving a transfer increases if the household receives social benets. Using the
ordered probit analysis, the probability of being a net receiver increases by 4.4
percentage points, when evaluated at sample means, if the household receives
social benets.2
2See Cox (1995) for a discussion on the connection between public transfers and private
interfamily transfers.
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Female headed households are also more likely to be net recipients. Using
the ordered probit analysis once more, one can quantify this gender e¤ect at 3.8
percentage points (at sample means). Marital status also increases the proba-
bility of being a net-receiver by 5.3 percentage points, while having no working
people in the household also increases the probability of being a net receiver
by 4.1 percentage points (both evaluated at sample means). Households where
there are sick or injured people are more likely to be net-receivers. However,
this e¤ect is merely 1.7 percentage points (at sample means). Finally, house-
holds who live in urban areas are also more likely to be net receivers, by 5.9
percentage points than their rural counterparts (at sample means).
5 Conclusions
The motives underlying inter-household private transfers are important for a
number of important phenomena, including the e¤ects of income redistribu-
tion, tax and debt policies, allocation of resources, safety nets and structural
models of the households. We provide empirical microeconometric evidence on
inter-household private transfers for Bulgaria and use our results to evaluate the
empirical relevance of the altruism model and of the exchange model of inter-
household private transfer behavior. We nd that neither model is strongly
rejected by the data and that both motives are likely to be at work to the same
extent. Hence, it is not likely that households may neutralize the e¤ects of in-
come redistribution policies. We nd that inter-household private transfers may
play an important role as a safety net, given their incidence and volume. Our
results suggest that capital market imperfections bind for consumption smooth-
ing. Household demographic characteristics matter to predict the incidence and
volume of inter-household private transfers, and, hence, income redistribution
policies should take into account such household demographic characteristics.
Finally, and quite interestingly, we nd that public transfers crowd-in inter-
household private transfers, even after controlling for a plethora of household
characteristics.
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Variable Coefficient t-value
Income
Income -1,38E-04 -5,044
Income^2 1,40E-11 3,471
Soc. Sec. Beneficiary 0,241 3,321
Education
Primary -0,352 -1,822
Midschool -0,381 -2,015
Secondary -0,417 -2,150
University -0,278 -1,394
Household (HH) Demographics
Age -0,144 -11,883
Age^2 0,001 10,276
Non-married Head 0,250 2,831
Female Head 0,178 1,968
Ill last 4 weeks 0,082 0,674
No Workers in HH 0,202 2,039
Total Workers in HH 0,142 2,913
Kids in HH 0,130 3,455
Dependent Adults in HH 0,050 1,524
HH lives in Urban Area 0,445 7,196
cut1 -5,058
cut2 -2,619
Dependent variable:
HH is net-givers (oprob = 0) 331
HH has no transfers (oprob = 1) 1.727
HH is net-receiver (oprob = 2) 369
Observations 2.427
Log-likelihood -1.704,18
Table 1 - Ordered Probit Analysis
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Variable Mean
Income
Income -3,70E-06 -0,930 0,103 0,616 10.202,470
Income^2 8,88E-12 6,89E-12 -1,53E-08 -0,770 5,12E+08
Soc. Sec. Beneficiary 0,329 3,452 -1.463,733 -3,357 0,801
Education
Primary 0,660 0,247 -.- -.- 0,132
Midschool -0,462 -0,176 -.- -.- 0,299
Secondary 0,132 0,496 -.- -.- 0,370
University 0,316 1,166 -.- -.- 0,178
Household (HH) Demographics
Age -0,010 -0,171 -16,001 -1,131 55,060
Age^2 -0,001 -1,295 -.- -.- 32.67150E+02
Age^3 0,159E-04 2,274 -.- -.- 20.55759E+04
Non-married Head 0,052 0,443 -774,648 -1,441 0,300
Female Head 0,332 2,878 382,210 0,774 0,220
Ill last 4 weeks 0,358 2,462 -.- -.- 0,591
No Workers in HH 0,181 1,294 -326,698 -0,551 0,410
Total Workers in HH 0,014 0,207 -158,719 -0,525 1,040
Kids in HH -0,065 -1,279 573,010 2,577 0,506
Dependent Adults in HH -0,088 -1,882 271,340 1,118 1,280
HH lives in Urban Area 0,318 3,611 -.- -.- 0,666
Inverse Mill's Ration 0,137 0,638
Constant 0,508 0,490 4.583,580 5,991 1,000
Recipients: 369
Observations 2.427
Log-likelihood -4.613,70
(a) In selection equation dependent variable is transfer receipt as binary variable (1 if receives transfers; 0 otherwise).
(b) In structural or regression equation dependent variable is net transfer amount received.
-.- means that the variable was not used as a regressor
Selection Equation (a) Structural Equation (b)
Table 2 - Heckman Selection Model - Transfers Received
